This paper empirically investigates the cause of asymmetric pricing: retail prices responding faster to cost increases than decreases. Using daily price data for over 11,000 retail gasoline stations I find that prices fall slower than they rise as a consequence of firms extracting informational rents from consumers with positive search costs. Premium gasoline prices are shown to fall slower than regular fuel prices but rise at the same pace, and this pricing pattern supports theories based upon competition with consumer search. Further testing also rejects focal price collusion as an important determinant of asymmetric pricing.
Introduction
A burgeoning body of economic literature has focused on the retail gasoline industry. The increased attention stems from the market being substantially influenced by factors rigorously studied by microeconomic theorists: search costs, spatial differentiation, tacit collusion, and Edgeworth cycles to name a few. The primary line of investigation in this paper will center around the issue of asymmetric pricing: the tendency for firms to adjust retail prices in greater magnitude in response to cost increases than cost decreases.
Using data from the UK retail gasoline market, Bacon (1991) was the first to document that firms respond more quickly to cost increases than decreases, while also coining the phrase "rockets and feathers" to describe the phenomenon. Supporting the hypothesis that gasoline prices shoot up like rockets but fall like feathers are the findings of Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert 1 (1997), whose empirical model has served as the foundation for identifying asymmetric price adjustments. Building on the work of BCG, a substantial body of literature has identified rockets and feathers in retail gasoline markets in Canada, the United States, Chile, and a host of European countries. Asymmetric pricing, however, is not confined to the retail gasoline industry; Peltzman (2000) examines 242 diverse product markets and confirms rockets and feathers to be a common pricing phenomenon in more than two thirds of the markets. The study finds, on average, the immediate retail price response to a positive cost shock to be twice the size of the response to a negative cost change, and the difference in magnitude can persist for months following the initial cost shock. These empirical findings, until recently, were unexplained by economic theory, and even now there exists a lack of consensus as to asymmetric pricing's underlying cause. One of the first explanations to gain traction was that it was a precipitant of a type of focal price collusion; 2 firms coordinate on the previous period's price until demand or wholesale cost conditions impel a change. When costs drop firms hold retail prices constant so as to increase profit margins, but they raise prices in response to a cost increase to maintain a positive margin and/or not be viewed as cheating on the collusive agreement. Thus, retail prices respond faster to cost increases than decreases. While this variant of focal price collusion offers a convenient framework within which to discuss asymmetric price movements, there is no formal analysis showing that it is equilibrium price behavior.
Conversely, a number of recent papers have theoretically derived asymmetric pricing as a consequence of search costs. In particular, Lewis (2010) , Tappata (2009) , Yang and Ye (2008) , and Cabral and Fishman (2008) each find that firms may extract informational rents from consumers unaware of input cost changes and therefore exhibit price asymmetry. Lewis (2010) posits consumers to form adaptive expectations about the current market price distribution, and shows that firms can exploit these irrational beliefs by slowly lowering prices in response to a negative cost change. Tappata (2009) and Yang and Ye (2008) each construct a model where consumers rationally form expectations of current market prices, and find, similar to Lewis (2010) , that firms capitalize on buyers' imperfect information by pricing asymmetrically. Lewis (2010) finds empirical support for his search-based theory, however, his paper critically relies upon consumers disregarding all current information in forming their search strategy. To the best of my knowledge, other than Lewis (2010) , no other paper has been able to empirically verify or discredit any specific theory of rockets and feathers.
The goal of this paper is to employ an expansive data set to determine the underlying cause of asymmetric pricing. In the process, rockets and feathers is identified as a property of retail gasoline prices across a wide variety of markets. To investigate the sources of asymmetric pricing, I exploit one year of daily regular and premium unleaded gasoline price observations for more than 11,000 firms. An overwhelming majority of the rockets and feathers literature employs temporally and/or spatially aggregated data to document the phenomenon. In establishing the existence of asymmetric pricing with data disaggregated to the daily-firm level, I estimate its magnitude with a high degree of precision. I find that five days after an initial wholesale price shock firms incorporate 46% of a positive cost change into their final price, but only 24% of a negative change. The difference in the speed of retail price adjustment to positive and negative cost changes persists for more than eight days, and the slower adjustment to negative shocks costs consumers an additional 4¢ per gallon over the time spanned by the data set.
While confirming the existence of asymmetric pricing is in accordance with much of the literature, heretofore, there has been almost no empirical sifting of the various theoretical explanations of this pricing behavior. With the aid of a rich data set, I find robust evidence in favor of the consumer search-based theories posited in Yang and Ye (2008) and Tappata (2009) , and little support for focal price collusion. The theories based upon competition with consumer search offer a number of testable predictions, three of which are supported by the empirical analysis in this study. First, Yang and Ye (2008) show that products whose consumers are less likely to shop for the lowest price are slower to adjust downwards following a negative cost shock, but increase at the same rate following a cost increase. This implication is confirmed by examining the dynamic properties of firms' markup of premium over regular unleaded fuel. Specifically, the gap increases following a cost decrease but remains constant following a cost increase; premium prices, therefore, fall slower than regular prices, but rise at the same speed. I argue that there is a systematic difference in the search costs of consumers who purchase either premium or regular gasoline, and as such confirm the prediction of Yang and Ye (2008) .
By studying the markup of premium over regular, I isolate how specific firms price products purchased by distinctly different consumers. The value added by this approach to a study such as Peltzman (2000) is it measures not only the relative asymmetry of different products, but also how the same firm prices two different goods that are subject to nearly identical cost shocks. Thus, many important determinants of the dynamic price behavior of the two products are controlled for, except the type of consumers buying the goods. The unique pricing patterns of premium and regular gasoline is, therefore, partially attributable to differences between the two products' consumers.
A second implication of Yang and Ye (2008) and Tappata (2009) is that the gains from search inversely relate to the magnitude of price asymmetry. This is confirmed by quantifying the connection between market price dispersion and the degree of price asymmetry; markets with a greater price range or variance (both positively correlated with gains from search) are found to adjust slower to cost increases and and faster to decreases. A third test of search-based theory investigates the pricing pattern of monopolistic firms. The theory predicts that if a market is served by a single firm then prices will respond with equal speed to price increases and decreases. In kind, the empirical analysis in this paper shows that monopolies price symmetrically.
Conversely, little evidence in favor of collusion as a consequential determinant of rockets and feathers is uncovered. After isolating firms with the greatest potential to be acting collusively, these businesses are found to exhibit no more asymmetry than firms almost certainly not colluding. Moreover, there is no verifiable relationship between the magnitude of asymmetry and price levels, suggesting that asymmetric pricing is not a means for collusive firms to inflate prices. In total, the data strongly suggests that asymmetric pricing is a rational profit maximizing strategy amongst non-collusive firms operating in a market typified by consumer search costs.
Rockets and feathers has long been established as an empirical regularity of a diverse set of product markets. A deep understanding of the pricing phenomenon's cause, however, has lagged behind. Theory based on oligopolistic competition with consumer search recently supplied a rigorous foundation upon which to analyze the properties of asymmetric price adjustments. The econometric results presented in this paper substantiates the theory as an accurate description of the pricing pattern's underlying mechanism. Using data that covers a large range of markets and is disaggregated to the daily-firm level adds further robustness to the empirical findings, and consequently, confidence in the validity of the search theory of rockets and feathers.
The outline of the paper is as follows; section 2 reviews past empirical approaches and introduces the econometric model used to perform the analysis, section 3 discusses the data and its general properties, section 4 presents new evidence of rockets and feathers, section 5 tests search-based theories of price asymmetry, section 6 examines focal price collusion, and section 7 concludes.
A Model of Asymmetric Pricing
When Bacon (1991) first tested for the presence of retail price response asymmetry, he specified the following functional form:
where R t is the retail price at time t, C t is the price of crude oil, and t is a normally distributed iid shock. Bacon estimates the coefficient of the quadratic term, β 2 , to be positive and significantly different from zero, and subsequently concludes that there exists response asymmetry. However, this model posits an overly rigid relationship between retail price changes, R t − R t−1 , and its long-run relationship with cost, ϑ 0 + ϑ 1 C t−1 − R t−1 . Specifically, equation (1) restricts retail prices to have equally proportional adjustments towards the new price equilibrium in each of the periods following the initial cost shock. Further shortcomings are detailed in BCG and Geweke (2004) .
In light of the restrictions imposed by Bacon (1991) , BCG proposed a more general test which has become the standard identification technique in the rockets and feathers literature. As the model serves an integral role in the empirical work presented in the following sections, it is useful to go through the model's derivation. First, BCG posit a long-run relationship between the price of wholesale gasoline and the retail price charged by firms:
where the variables are defined as in equation (1). Given the long-run relationship between retail price and the cost of gasoline, BCG then posit the short-run response of retail prices to a cost change. First, ∆X t = X t − X t−1 is defined for any variable of interest X. Then, they define the short-run effect of a cost change in period t on retail prices in period t to be:
Yet, the adjustment of retail prices to changes in the wholesale cost of gasoline do not occur solely within the period of observation, and may take weeks to fully transmit. Thus, BCG include lagged changes in cost to arrive at the following equation:
Here, n is the number of time periods it takes retail prices to fully adjust to a one time cost shock. Equation (4) restricts retail prices to adjust symmetrically to positive and negative changes in cost.
As the aim of the model is to test whether or not this is a valid assumption, the restriction is loosened and then tested to see if it has any bite. Thus, equation (4) is rewritten so that separate coefficients for positive and negative wholesale price changes may be estimated:
Here, ∆C + t−j takes the value of ∆C t−j if it is positive, and zero otherwise; ∆C − t−j takes the value of ∆C t−j if it is negative, and zero otherwise. 3 The appeal of equation (5) is that it not only allows for asymmetric price adjustments, but also places minimal restrictions on the path of adjustment over many time periods to a one time change in wholesale costs. In general, BCG claim that if significant differences between the coefficients for positive and negative cost shocks, β + j and β − j , are estimated then the available data supports the existence of rockets and feathers.
Before BCG proceed with the estimation they further enrich the estimated equation. First, lagged changes in retail price are included to allow for the possibility of previous retail price changes affecting current pricing decisions. In the long-run firms fully incorporate cost changes into retail prices; in the short-run, perhaps due to menu costs or competitive considerations, firms may face a tradeoff between changing retail prices today or in the future. More importantly, BCG reconcile the model to deal with a problem found throughout the literature on retail gasoline prices. Namely, retail price and cost series are cointegrated. There exists a common solution to the problem of cointegration -transforming the model into an error-correction form.
4 By adding the one period lagged residual from equation (2) to equation (5), short-run adjustments to price shocks as well as the tendency for retail prices and wholesale costs to revert to their long-run relationship can be separately estimated:
Equation (6) serves as the foundation for BCG's empirical investigation, which supports the existence of asymmetric pricing. They find that for up to four weeks following a crude oil price change, retail prices more quickly incorporate a positive shock; 67% of a positive cost change is included in the final price after four weeks, but only 38% of a negative change. Yet, BCG also estimate retail prices to increase for up to two weeks following a price decrease, indicating that their econometric model may be misspecified or suffer from temporally aggregated data.
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Accordingly, recent literature has contended that BCG's results critically rely upon data aggregated across time and stations and nonstandard econometric techniques. Galeotti et al. (2003) and Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) each criticize BCG's paper for estimating in one step both the long and short-run adjustments in retail price to cost changes. 6 Furthermore, it is noted that due to BCG's utilization of 2SLS to estimate parameters of interest, their estimates will converge to the true values exponentially slower than when using standard OLS. Lastly, Remer (2010) employs the same data set as in this paper in conjunction with the 2SLS technique employed by BCG and finds implausible results; retail prices immediately increase by 10% of the size of a cost decrease, and fall by 18% of the size of a cost increase. The problems associated with BCG's 2SLS regression are also shown to become accentuated when used in conjunction with temporally aggregated data.
To correct for the problems thought to exist in BCG, it is proposed to estimate the error-correction model in two steps, as originally posited in Engle and Granger (1987) . Equation (2) is first estimated using OLS and then the pertinent values are substituted into (6) . Additionally, equation (6) is generalized to not only allow retail prices to respond asymmetrically to short-run cost shocks, but also to permit asymmetric adjustments to the new long-run equilibrium. Thus, the following equation has been put forth in the literature as an improvement over the BCG model:
Here, φ 0 and φ 1 are estimated via equation (2) and substituted into (7), and ϑ (7) and fail to reject symmetric pricing; the study, however, employs monthly averaged prices for entire European countries, and findings in Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) and Remer (2010) suggest that data aggregated to this level is highly susceptible to bias. Eckert (2002) uses weekly averaged retail prices from Windsor, Ontario in conjunction with equation (6) and finds support for asymmetric pricing; one week after a cost shock retail prices incorporate 120% of a positive change but only 24% of a negative change. Deltas (2008) utilizes monthly averaged data for 47 states in the USA in conjunction with equation (6) and yields evidence in favor of rockets and feathers; one month after an initial price shock retail prices incorporate 17% more of a positive cost change. Using weekly price observations from South Orange County, CA, Verlinda (2008) estimates an error-correction model like equation (7) and finds that three weeks after a cost change retail prices increase by 110% of a positive cost shock, but decrease by only 83% of a negative shock. Conversely, Hosken et al. (2008) utilize weekly averaged data from individual firms in the Washington, DC metro area to estimate equation (7) and find that asymmetric pricing poorly explains the retail price changes in their data.
The aforementioned studies represent only a sample of the empirical asymmetric pricing literature and, by and large, a substantial body of work has coalesced in favor of prices responding in greater magnitude to cost increases than decreases. 7 In the subsequent sections, equation (7) is estimated utilizing the two-step OLS estimation procedure in order to identify the existence of asymmetric pricing in the retail gasoline industry.
Data and Summary Statistics
The econometric analysis in this paper is buoyed by a richly detailed data set consisting of daily price observations from Lewis (2010) , and Lewis (2008) ). Moreover, studies that do utilize station-specific daily price observations for complete markets take their prices from websites whose data is user reported (e.g., Eckert and West (2004)) 10 .
As pointed out in Atkinson (2008) , consumer-reported internet data may be subject to a host of biases that can lead to misleading results when high time frequency data or prices for independent stations are needed. The price data limitations that have hindered previous studies in the rockets and feathers literature pose less of a concern in this paper. The data set is geographically balanced and contains complete markets, observations occur at daily time frequencies, retail prices derive from credit card transactions and station self-reporting, not potentially biased consumer reports, and a host of pertinent station characteristic information complements the price data. Thus, I am not only well equipped to explore the existence of asymmetric pricing, but also to consider its underlying cause.
8 Figure 2 is a screen shot of the website from where I scraped the data. 9 These numbers are consistent with those reported in previous studies whose data is directly obtained from OPIS. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the data scraped from mapquest represents an incomplete sample of stations whose prices are reported by OPIS.
10 A notable exception is Chandra and Tappata (2008) . However, the focus of their paper, to test whether price dispersion is a consequence of search costs, is unrelated to this paper.
The daily gasoline spot prices listed on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) is employed as the cost variable. Reformulated gasoline delivered from the New York and Los Angeles Harbors are used for firms located in the eastern and western states, respectively. In reality gas stations purchase gasoline in the wholesale market at the rack price posted at local terminals or at the Dealer Tank Wagon (DTW) price, which is negotiated privately between firms and refineries. While I was unable to obtain this cost data, Chandra and Tappata (2008) note that monthly spot, rack, and DTW prices are almost perfectly correlated.
11 Since retail price responses to changes in cost is what is of interest, utilizing spot instead of terminal or DTW prices should not limit the accuracy of results. Another potential concern is which day's spot price to use for a given day's retail price. Even though wholesale costs change daily, gas stations do not receive a new shipment of gasoline every day. Thus, lagged values of cost reflect the price paid by firms that do not replenish their inventory on a given day. However, the concurrent day's spot price reflects the opportunity cost of holding inventory and is generally the index by which stations set their price. 12 Therefore, in accordance with the literature, I match retail prices with the same day's spot price.
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The spatial makeup of individual markets plays an important role in the econometric analysis.
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In particular, the number of competing stations within given distances of the firm of interest is incorporated into each test. To calculate this I first needed to geocode the data. 15 A variety of software packages facilitated this process. First, the addresses were converted into geographical coordinates by software provided by USC's Department of Geography and cross referenced with coordinates determined by Yahoo maps. Any coordinates that did not match or were unable to be determined with sufficient precision were then geocoded by hand using the Google maps API. Once every station was coded, the distance between all pairs of firms was calculated using the Euclidean distance measure. Given these distance measures, I then calculated market concentration for a variety of market definitions. Throughout the econometric investigation, a host of control variables supplement the estimated equations. Table 3 reports summary statistics for pertinent station and market characteristic variables that are at times included as additional controls. Also reported in the table are the results of regressing regular unleaded retail price on those traits. 16 In step with previous studies, such 11 In the appendix of Chandra and Tappata (2008), it is noted that monthly spot, rack, and DTW prices have a correlation greater than .99. 12 The Association for Convenience and Petroleum Retailing, a lobbying group for gas stations, explains in their 2009 Gas Price Kit that firms set their retail price based on the "replacement cost" of gasoline: the current wholesale price. 13 Chandra and Tappata (2008), Lewis (2008) , and Verlinda (2008) also use this approach. 14 Houde (2009) finds that both market structure and the commuter paths of consumers significantly impact retail price dynamics. 15 Geocoding is the process of converting street addresses into longitude and latitude coordinates. 16 Before regressing retail price on station characteristics all taxes are removed. Also, day of the week controls are included in each of the regressions. For the statistic % independent competitors ≤ .1 miles only stations with at least as Eckert and West (2004) and Hosken et al. (2008) , independent brand retailers are found to charge significantly lower prices than majors. Additionally, prices increase with the distance to the closest competitor, which indicates that firms are able to exploit available market power. The number of competing firms within a given distance has no significant sway over price levels. This is a consequence of two counteracting effects; the number of firms within a given distance positively correlates with the degree of competition, which decreases prices levels, but also serves as a proxy for demand, which positively correlates with price levels. Therefore, the net effect of the number of firms within a given distance, if no other market characteristics are controlled for, becomes insignificant. Acting as a better representation of local competition is the percentage of competitors that are not major brands. Table 3 indicates that prices decrease if more competitors are independents. A host of previous papers find that independent retailers are more likely to undercut their rivals' prices, thereby increasing market competition.
17 Thus, the basic statistics are consistent with the existing literature.
The time over which I analyze data was a particularly volatile period in the gasoline industry; the price of oil peaked at just over 126¢ per gallon and fell to a low of 31¢. Figure 1 plots the wholesale and average retail price for regular unleaded gasoline over this time period, and Table 2 presents summary statistics for the average daily prices of premium, regular, and wholesale gasoline. The most striking feature of Figure 1 is the rapid decline in gas prices during the autumn of 2008, which coincides with a financial crisis and worldwide slowdown of production. A primary concern, given the lengthy downward trend, is that the price and cost series may not be stationary in first differences. However, augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (Said and Dickey, 1984) assure that both price and cost are stationary in first differences. Actually, a drastic run-up and/or run-down of the price of oil is not atypical of data sets used to identify asymmetric pricing; Borenstein et al. (1997) , Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) , and Galeotti et al. (2003) all use data encompassing the first Gulf War (when the price of oil more than doubled), and Verlinda (2008) tests for asymmetry with data influenced by two major runs on wholesale prices (caused by the Texas to Arizona pipeline rupture and San Francisco, CA refinery outage). As large swings in the price of oil over short periods of time are fairly common, the effects of the financial crisis in the data should not be viewed as an anomaly or hinderance, but as an opportunity to explore asymmetric pricing with data representative of the inherent volatility of the price of oil.
At first glance retail prices in Figure 1 appear to drop simultaneously with wholesale costs, yet upon close inspection there exist many instances when costs drop suddenly and retail prices slowly (or never) follow suit. Around mid-December 2008 and again during mid-July 2009, for example, one competitor within .1 miles are considered. This analogously holds for the subsequent two statistics in Table 3 . there are sharp declines in cost, but retail prices exhibit only a gradual decline. Also consistent with asymmetric pricing is the noticeably higher retail margins during the large decline in wholesale prices from mid-September to the end of December. In total, it is not obvious whether retail prices adjust faster to price increases than decreases, and a careful analysis using the model detailed in the previous section is needed.
Testing for the Presence of Asymmetric Pricing
Prior to testing theories of asymmetric pricing, I first establish its presence in the data. To the best of my knowledge, no previous study of rockets and feathers has documented the phenomenon with daily firm-level data for such a large number of geographically diverse firms. Previous firm-level studies of asymmetric pricing utilized data detailing only a single metropolitan area. Analysis presented in Remer (2010) illustrates that aggregating data to even weekly averages can contaminate parameter estimates. Therefore, verifying the phenomenon's existence with temporally disaggregated data for firms located in rural and urban markets on both coasts of the USA serves as an important contribution to the literature.
To ascertain if retail gasoline firms react more quickly to cost increases than decreases, I estimate the error-correction model as recommended in Engle and Granger (1987) . That is, I first estimate equation (2) using OLS, then substitute the parameter values into equation (7) and estimate that equation again using OLS. This estimation procedure is appropriate for several reasons. First, employing the standard error-correction technique assures separate identification of short-run responses to cost shocks and the tendency for retail prices to return to their long-run relationship with costs. Also, the stationarity of the regressors in equation (7) enables standard significance tests of the parameters and functions of multiple parameters. 18 As quantifying the degree of price asymmetry involves constructing response functions from multiple parameters, estimating the model in standard error-correction form, as opposed to the non-standard econometric technique employed in BCG, ensures that I am constructing appropriate confidence intervals to test for asymmetry. Finally, in light of the recent critiques of BCG in Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) and Galeotti et al. (2008) , I err on the side of caution by following the procedure originally posited in Engle and Granger (1987) , whose properties have been widely studied.
Before proceeding with the econometrics, a host of controls are included to account for differ-ences in local market conditions and firm specific traits. First, station fixed effects are added to equation (2) to allow for the possibility that individual firms employ different long-run markups or consistently purchase wholesale gasoline at relatively high or low prices. Additionally, equation (7) is augmented to control for the effect that local competition, demand conditions, and firm traits may have on short-run adjustments. In particular, the log of population of the city of operation for each station, 19 the number of competitors within .1 miles, between .1 and 1.5 miles, and between 1.5 and 5 miles, the distance of the closest competitor, a dummy variable indicating whether the station is a major brand, 20 and the percentage of independent stations within .1, between .1 and 1.5 miles, and between 1.5 and 5 miles are all added to the equation. Finally, day of the week dummies are included in the second step of the econometric procedure to control for predictable changes in demand conditions over the course of the week.
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Regression results are reported in Table 4 with standard errors clustered by station and corrected for heteroscedasticity. 22 The regression produces economically plausible results consistent with the existence rockets and feathers. The coefficients for being above or below the long-run equilibrium retail price, ϑ + 1 and ϑ − 1 respectively, are both negative. This implies that when retail prices are above (below) their long-run equilibrium value there exists downward (upward) pressure guiding retail prices towards their long-run equilibrium relationship with cost. Also, the estimated value for the long-run relationship between retail prices and wholesale costs, φ 1 in equation (2), is 1.04.
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Previous literature, such as Verlinda (2008) and Lewis (2010) , has argued that if demand is linear and marginal cost is constant across all quantities then there should be a dollar for dollar pass through of costs to retail prices in the long-run (i.e. φ 1 = 1). While the estimate of φ 1 is slightly above one, it is much closer than the values obtained for the same parameter in most studies of asymmetric pricing in the retail gasoline industry.
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Supporting the existence of rockets and feathers is that the coefficient on first period positive cost changes, .08, is significantly greater than for negative cost changes, .00. 25 Thus, one day following a 10¢ positive cost shock retail prices increase by .8¢, but do not change following a negative shock. This alone, however, is not proof of asymmetric pricing, as I must account for a complicated lag structure and track the entirety of the dynamic price adjustment. To accomplish this, the estimated parameters are used to construct cumulative response functions (CRF's), which map the adjustment of retail prices over time in response to a one time, one cent change in wholesale cost. The CRF's are formulated using the equations specified in the appendix of Borenstein et al. (1997) . 26 After an initial one cent increase to costs at t = 0, the period k change in retail price, B + k , is determined by:
Then, the CRF is a recursive function which sums n equations, where n is the number of periods it takes retail prices to completely respond to a one time change in cost, and the period k ∈ {1, ..., n} cumulative adjustment is as stated in equation (8) . The CRF detailing the response to a cost decrease is defined analogously to equation (8) . Figure 3 plots the CRF's and 95% confidence intervals corresponding to the regression in Table  4 , and it is clear that the existence of rockets and feathers is a widespread phenomenon in the retail gasoline industry. Here, the vertical axis plots the percentage of the total cost shock that has been incorporated into the final retail price. 27 For just over eight days following a one time cost shock, the cumulative response is significantly greater for positive than negative shocks. This result is in step with much of the literature, but serves as a stark contrast to the findings of Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) and Galeotti et al. (2008) who employ the same estimation procedure to reject the existence of rockets and feathers. As these studies attribute the rejection of the phenomenon to utilizing a more reliable estimation procedure than BCG, I note that even when employing the more appropriate techniques the data overwhelmingly supports the existence of the pricing behavior.
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To highlight the presence of price asymmetry, as well as the cost it presents to consumers, I measure the loss in consumer welfare due to the pricing behavior. Welfare loss is calculated by subtracting the monetary gain consumers enjoy from a cost decrease from the losses accrued by a cost increase:
26 I depart from BCG's specification only in that retail prices are allowed to asymmetrically return to their long-run relationship with cost. 27 In Figure 3 , for example, the fourth day after a cost change firms are estimated to have raised retail prices by 38% of the size of a positive shock and to have lowered prices by 18% of the size of a negative shock.
28 This is not to say that this paper's findings are inconsistent with the other two studies. Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) investigates the connection between oil shocks and wholesale prices. Galeotti et al. (2008) employs monthly averaged price data, and previous literature has found that data aggregated to this level can contaminate parameter estimates. It is of note, however, that the aforementioned studies claim their finding of non-existence of price asymmetry is partially attributable to the model choice, yet this paper employs the same model and finds existence.
29 This is the same measure of consumer welfare as in BCG.
Here, B + j and B − j are defined as in equation (8), and linear interpolation is used to approximate the CRF's at non-integer values. The results are graphed in Figure 4 , and the welfare loss to consumers as a result of asymmetric pricing becomes clear; the cumulative cost to consumers increases for up to ten days following a wholesale gasoline price shock. Ten days after the initial one cent cost change consumers lose about 1.3¢ more from an increase than they gain from a decrease, and the difference is significantly different from zero with 99% confidence.
As another gauge of the welfare implication of asymmetric pricing, I calculate how much a typical driver would have saved over the time spanned by the data if retail prices had adjusted symmetrically. To perform this counterfactual, retail prices are predicted under the assumption that they respond with equal speed to positive and negative cost shocks, and compared to the case of asymmetric adjustment. More specifically, symmetric prices are generated using parameter estimates of equation (7), but lagged negative changes in cost parameters, β − j , are replaced with the estimates for positive cost changes, β + j . Additionally, ϑ + 1 , the effect of price being above its long-run relationship with cost, is replaced with ϑ − 1 , the effect of price being below its long-run relationship with cost, to ensure retail prices descend to their long-run equilibrium following a negative cost shock at the same speed they are estimated to rise to their long-run equilibrium after a positive shock. Asymmetric prices are predicted using the true estimates of equation (7). Figure 5 plots the predictions of asymmetric and symmetric retail prices using the daily NYMEX spot price for regular unleaded gasoline as the cost data. . 31 Each driver purchased, on average, .63 gallons of fuel per day. In turn, the typical gasoline consumer would have spent $9.33 less on fuel over this time if prices had responded symmetrically to cost shocks. This amounts to an additional $1.91 billion in savings across the entire driving population of the United States. Thus, I find strong evidence in favor of asymmetric pricing and that it poses a real cost to consumers. 30 The spot price used in the predictions is a daily weighted-average of the closing spot price of reformulated gasoline shipped from the Los Angeles, CA and NY, NY Harbors; the weights used to average the cost data reflect the proportion of gas stations in the data set located in the west or east coast of the United States.
31 Gasoline consumption data is made publicly available by the Energy Information Administration.
5 Search Costs as the cause of Asymmetric Pricing
Theoretical Background and Testable Hypothesis
The identification of asymmetric pricing in the retail gasoline market is in step with much of the previous empirical literature. Until recently, however, rockets and feathers was thought to be at odds with microeconomic theory. Informal models of focal price collusion were conjectured as the cause, but no rigorous theory or empirical support has surfaced. On the other hand, formal models of asymmetric pricing as a consequence of consumer search costs have been developed in recent years. For the purposes of this paper, I focus on the results of Yang and Ye (2008) and Tappata (2009) ; the two studies offer unique models with qualitatively similar results. Before the implications of the two papers are tested it is helpful to outline the models and intuition underlying the results. Both models rely upon the assumption that consumers do not observe firms' marginal cost of production, but may learn this cost through market search and purchase decisions. In each period every firm faces the same marginal cost, which evolves according to a Markov process; the underlying parameters of the Markov process are common knowledge to both firms and consumers. In equilibrium firms use mixed strategies to set prices, and both studies prove that there exists more price dispersion when costs are low. Consumers with nonzero search costs have a greater incentive to search when prices are more dispersed, as the expected gain from obtaining additional price quotes is higher when the distribution of prices is more spread out. Therefore, consumers search more intensely when they believe marginal costs to be low.
Given these preliminary results, both papers consider a dynamic setting whereby marginal costs can take one of two values, high or low. Additionally, costs are assumed to exhibit persistence (i.e. the probability of costs remaining the same next period is greater than 1 2 ). First, consider the case when costs transition from a low state in period one to a high state in the next period. Through search and purchase decisions in the first period consumers update their beliefs in favor of marginal costs being low. Due to the persistence of costs, consumers then believe that costs are likely to remain low the next period, and therefore, have a strong incentive to search in period two. However, if the costs become high in period two then consumers are likely to discover the cost change due to their high search intensity. Firms, therefore, adjust prices upwards quickly to reflect updated consumer knowledge.
On the other hand, consider the case when costs are high in period one and transition to low in period two. After period one consumers update their beliefs to reflect the high cost state, and optimally choose a lower search intensity for period two. If, however, costs drop in period two consumers are less likely to discover the change due to their lower search intensity. Firms then have a low incentive to drop prices as consumers' beliefs are less likely to incorporate the cost drop. In total, retail prices adjust slower to cost decreases than increases. While this discussion is a simplification of Yang and Ye (2008) and Tappata (2009) it captures the basic intuition; consumers are less likely to be informed about a cost decrease, and consequently, firms lower prices slowly so as to profitably exploit consumers' lack of knowledge.
The theory developed in Yang and Ye (2008) and Tappata (2009) offers testable predictions, three of which I address in the following subsections. First, Yang and Ye (2008) prove that if the proportion of "shoppers", consumers that face zero search costs, increases then retail prices will adjust downward more slowly in response to a negative cost shock. 32 Intuitively, if the number of shoppers in a market decrease then there is less equilibrium search. Therefore, consumers are generally less informed when costs drop, and consequently, retail prices fall slower. A second verifiable consequence of search-based theory is that greater expected gains from search result in a lower magnitude of price asymmetry. This is true as larger gains from search incentivize more equilibrium search, and thereby, consumers are better informed. Firms are then less able to take advantage of unknowledgable buyers, and prices descend more quickly. A final search theoretic result is that a monopoly will price symmetrically. These firms will not exhibit price asymmetry as they maximize profit by setting the monopoly price each period, and this price responds symmetrically to cost shocks. In the following three subsections I carefully test these three implications of theories based upon competition with consumer search.
When Consumers Search Less -The Case of Premium Fuel
To empirically examine the consequences of search-based price asymmetry, I rely upon the differences in consumers who purchase regular versus premium unleaded gasoline. Premium gasoline has a higher octane rating 33 than regular fuel, and in my data set, sold for, on average, 25.6¢ more per gallon. However, in cars manufactured since the early 1990's almost all engines have been designed to automatically correct engine knocking, thereby rendering the performance advantage of premium gasoline almost negligible (Ford 2008) . 34 In spite of this fact, many luxury vehicles' warranties may be voided if anything but premium fuel is put into the tank. Thus, drivers of more expensive cars are more likely to purchase premium gasoline than owners of less expensive automobiles. Luxury car owners tend to have higher incomes, and Barron et al. (2000) presents convincing evidence that high income consumers that purchase premium fuel are typified by greater search costs. Consumers that are not required by warranty to purchase premium fuel pay a large markup for a product that offers almost no perceptible benefit over regular fuel. Healey (2003) notes, "engineers, scientists and the federal government say there's little need for premium." Consequently, consumers not bound by contract to purchase high octane fuel, but still choose to do so, are ill informed. Consumers 32 This claim is explicitly stated and proved in Proposition 8 of Yang and Ye (2008). 33 Octane rating measures a fuel's resistance to engine knocking. 34 Also, premium gasoline neither increases fuel efficiency nor reduces harmful emissions.
that do not acquire information pertaining to product value can accurately be described as having a high cost of search for product quality information. Any correlation between consumers' search cost for obtaining product quality information and price information translates into purchasers of premium gasoline having a high cost of price search. Additionally, Manzan and Zerom (2009) finds that consumers of premium gasoline are exceedingly more demand inelastic than regular buyers across all price levels. Given that consumers of premium gasoline generally earn higher incomes, are far less price sensitive, and possibly less informed than consumers of regular fuel it appears safe to assume that premium customers are (i) typified by higher search costs and (ii) less likely to be a "shopper" for the lowest possible price.
35 Assumptions (i) and (ii) in conjunction with Yang and Ye's (2008) prediction that a lower proportion of shoppers increases price asymmetry allows the following hypothesis to be tested.
Hypothesis 1
Firms price premium gasoline with a greater magnitude of asymmetry than regular fuel, and the increased asymmetry is entirely a result of slower adjustment to cost decreases.
Before undertaking the analysis, an issue in the data must first be dealt with; the data set only contains new premium fuel price observations for, on average, 12% of stations each day. Consequently, if empirical testing is performed on the station-level at daily intervals then a majority of the data will be dropped from the analysis. 36 To ameliorate the problem and maximize the amount of information extracted from the data, the following analysis is performed at the daily market-level (as opposed to firm-level). It is more prudent to spatially aggregate the data than to average it across time because results presented in Remer (2010) convey that temporally aggregating data can severely bias results, but little is changed by averaging prices across cities. Defining a market in the retail gasoline industry can be difficult; firms one mile apart may compete with each other, but the total set of competitors that each faces may not be the same. Essentially the retail gasoline industry consists of a large number of overlapping markets, of which each firm may belong to more than one. This caveat is addressed in the same fashion as Chandra and Tappata (2008) and Lewis (2008) ; each firm is specified to be operating in a unique market of which they are located at the center. Then, I define a market to be a 1.5 mile radius around each firm.
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To test the implications of search-based asymmetry, I first confirm that premium and regular prices respond asymmetrically to cost shocks, and premium and regular prices positively correlate 35 Here, "shopper" is defined as in the previous subsection: a consumer with zero search cost. 36 When lag lengths are set to ten a firm needs to have a run of eleven consecutive price observations to be included in the regression . 37 Lee (2009) finds that stations compete most heavily with competitors within one mile. I extend the market radius an extra half mile to ensure that I capture all pertinent competitive dynamics.
with wholesale costs.
38 Given these results, I then show that within specific markets premium and regular prices respond at the same speed to positive cost shocks, but premium falls slower after a negative cost change -thus confirming a prediction of search-based rockets and feathers theory. To begin, equation (7) is estimated using the same cost measures as in the previous section, but firm prices are replaced with market average prices. In estimating the long-run relationship between market price and cost (equation (2)) market-specific fixed effects are included, and a host of controls supplement equation (7): the number of competitors and the percentage of those who are independently branded in the market and between 1.5 and 5 miles of the market center, the log of population of the market, and day of the week controls. Regression results are reported in columns one and two of Table 5 for both premium and regular gasoline, respectively, and Figure 6 plots the corresponding CRF's.
39 Figure 6 illustrates that for more than nine days following an initial price shock premium fuel prices respond in greater magnitude to positive shocks than negative shocks, and this is true with 95% confidence. Also, premium reacts faster than regular to both positive and negative cost shocks. Premium prices do initially act slower in response to a negative cost shock, but by the sixth day after the shock its cumulative response is statistically greater than that of the regular price series. However, premium and regular gasoline exhibit no statistically significant difference in the magnitude of price asymmetry, as measured by equation (9) . While this analysis confirms that premium gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to cost shocks, not much can be said yet in regards to the relationship between consumer search costs and asymmetric pricing. To support the findings in Yang and Ye (2008) and Tappata (2009) I would like to show that premium prices fall slower than regular prices but rise at the same speed. Even though these regressions do not appear to support the theory's predictions, a closer and more careful look at the data reveals estimates largely consistent with search-based theory. The trouble with the tests reported in columns one and two of Table 5 is that the behavior of individual firms is muted. Comparing the premium and regular CRF's in Figure 6 , for example, is analogous to measuring how a firm in Seattle, WA prices premium relative to how a firm in Philadelphia, PA prices regular; while this may yield some insight it disregards the fact that the firm in Seattle sets both a premium and regular price, and it is the relative movement of those two prices that should be compared. Nevertheless, it is important to illustrate that when estimating the model with market average prices both types of fuel exhibit a significant degree of price asymmetry and positively correlate with the wholesale cost series. 38 In the previous section, regular fuel prices were found to exhibit price asymmetry. In this subsection, I show that this still holds when estimating the model with market-level data.
39 Standard errors reported in Table 5 are clustered by market and corrected for heteroscedasticity. As individual firms belong to multiple markets, this remedies the real possibility of error terms in equation (7) being correlated across observations. Also, I only include markets for which I have both premium and regular price data. Again all parameter estimates are not listed due to space constraints, but are available upon request.
A more informative estimation technique is to measure how premium prices move relative to regular prices within a given market, and then estimate the behavior of a typical market. Therefore, I now examine the dynamic behavior of the markup of premium over regular gasoline. By estimating the response to cost shocks of market average markups of premium over regular fuel I can isolate how the same firms price the two products over time. To begin, I create a new price series:
Here, P it and R it are the premium and regular prices, respectively, set in market i during time period t, and D it represents the markup of premium over regular gasoline. D it then acts as the price variable in equations (2) and (7), and the spot price of WTI crude oil traded on NYMEX is utilized as the cost variable. The spot price of oil is used instead of wholesale regular unleaded fuel to guard against the possibility that cost changes reflect shocks to regular unleaded fuel that are unrelated to premium gasoline. 40 Using the price of crude oil as the cost measure ensures that cost changes only reflect movement in the cost component shared by both types of fuel. I first estimate equation (2) and obtain economically plausible results. The relationship between the markup of premium over regular fuel and cost (φ 1 ) is found to be .008 and the constant (φ 0 ) is 26.3, both estimated with more than 99% confidence. Thus, the long-run markup of premium fuel over regular gasoline is nearly constant at 26.3¢; it only increases by .8¢ for every dollar increase in the per gallon price of oil. These coefficients are then substituted into equation (7), and the results of estimating the equation are listed in the third column of Table 5 and the corresponding CRF's are plotted in Figure 7 . The most striking feature of the CRF's plotted in Figure 7 is the distinct negative proportional response to a negative cost shock. This translates into D it , the gap between premium and regular prices, increasing when costs decrease. Figure 6 illustrates that both premium and regular prices drop in response to negative cost shocks; thereby, premium prices necessarily fall slower than regular prices in any given market in order for the gap to increase. The reaction to positive cost shocks is another story; the markup of premium over regular fuel barely changes. Only on days 2 through 4 after a positive cost shock can it be stated with 95% confidence that the response is greater than zero, and the amount above zero represents an economically meaningless change (less than .05¢ in response to a 1¢ cost change). That the markup does not change in response to a positive shock is highlighted in Table 5 where the only variables that are not significant are D it 's response to lagged positive cost changes of length 1,3, and 4. Figure 6 demonstrates both premium and regular prices increasing in response to a positive cost shock; therefore, premium and regular prices must rise at the same rate in a given market for the markup to remain constant. In conclusion, premium prices fall slower than regular prices in response to a negative cost shock, but rise at the same pace following a positive cost change. These estimates confirm hypothesis 1 and support consumer search costs as the mechanism behind rockets and feathers.
Search Incentives and the Magnitude of Asymmetry
In this subsection, I measure the relationship between the gains from search and asymmetry. In formulating their theory of rockets and feathers, Tappata (2009) and Yang and Ye (2008) both find that consumers increase their search intensity when prices are expected to be more dispersed. The result is a consequence of more varied prices offering consumers greater potential savings, and thereby, an increased incentive to search. And, according to Tappata (2009) and Yang and Ye (2008) , a more intensively searching consumer-base implies less market asymmetry.
Hypothesis 2 Markets with greater price dispersion exhibit less price asymmetry.
While yielding evidence in favor of hypothesis 2 would be consistent with search-based asymmetric pricing theory, the issue of causality must also be considered. The assumption underlying hypothesis 2 is that markets with more dispersed prices cause consumers to increase their intensity of search; however, a higher degree of search may also serve to drive down price-cost margins, leading to less price dispersion. Therefore, it is not entirely clear whether markets with low price dispersion discourage consumer search, or have low dispersion as a direct result of intensely searching consumers. To distinguish between the two cases, robustness checks are undertaken following the tests of hypothesis 2. Still, note that a direct consequence of search-based theory is that exogenous price dispersion negatively correlates with the magnitude of market price asymmetry.
The econometric tests in this and subsequent subsections will largely follow the same pattern: (i) define a market/firm characteristic that partitions the data and (ii) separately estimate the magnitude of asymmetry for the partitioned markets/firms. More formally, let d = {d 1 , ..., d n } be a set of dummy variables such that d i = 1 for a firm if they satisfy some condition (such as their closest competitor is located between 1 and 2 miles away) and d i = 0 otherwise, and for each firm d j = 1 and d −j = 0 for some j ∈ {1, ..., n}. Then create a new vector of variables Ω ≡ {α 11 , ..., α 1n , ..., α mn }, where n = |d| and m is the number of independent variables in equation (7), by interacting each dummy variable with each independent variable in equation (7) . Finally, each α ij ∈ Ω is added to equation (7), the new equation is estimated, and the estimated parameters are used to separately construct CRF's for each group of markets/firms.
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In this subsection, markets are partitioned according to their degree of regular fuel price dispersion, and in accordance with hypothesis 2, CRF's estimated for low dispersion markets exhibit a higher magnitude of asymmetry. As a first proxy for the gains from search, I calculate the average difference between the maximum and minimum price for regular unleaded fuel in each market over the course of the data. This statistic captures, on average, the most a consumer can save by visiting each firm in the market. I then divide the average price range distribution into quintiles and accordingly partition the set of markets. Figure 8 plots the estimated CRF's for firms that fall in either the first or fifth quintile, and the magnitude of asymmetry is greater for markets with a low average price range. 42 The average price range of markets in the first quintile is 4.3¢ compared to 21.9¢ for markets in the fifth quintile. Thus, consumers have a much stronger incentive to search in markets belonging to the upper quintile as apposed to the lower quintile. And, in accordance with search-based theory, there is a greater degree of asymmetry (1.01¢ cumulative difference ten days after a one cent cost shock) in markets with a lower incentive to search.
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Similar results are derived when the connection between average price variance in a market and the magnitude of asymmetry is measured. If the variance is close to zero then acquiring price information for an additional firm will yield minimal financial reward; conversely, a high price variance presents the opportunity for consumers to gain substantial surplus by searching for additional price data. Thus, search theory predicts an inverse relationship between the degree of price asymmetry and the average variance of prices in a market. As such, I estimate CRF's for markets in the upper or lower quintile of the price variance distribution, and again find support for search-based asymmetry. While the results are not as strong as with the previous measure of gains from search, the CRF's plotted in Figure 9 illustrate that for more than two days following a cost shock markets with a lower average variance exhibit more asymmetry.
44 Moreover, the difference in asymmetry is almost entirely due to low variance markets reacting more slowly to negative cost shocks. In sum, both measures of search incentives reveal a significant relationship with the rockets and feathers phenomenon, and in the direction posited by search theory. While these results are consistent with search-based asymmetric pricing, there exists another plausible explanation; markets with low price dispersion are populated by consumers who rigorously search for the lowest price. In other words, it may be that consumers are so well informed that all firms are forced to price near cost. In turn, firms in these markets exhibit a low gap between the highest and lowest price. Thus, it is not known if well informed consumers push the price gap close together or a small price gap provides disincentive for consumers to engage in costly search. To distinguish between the two cases, I test the relationship between market price levels and the proxies for search incentives. If a negative correlation between price variance or range and price levels exists then it is unlikely that intense consumer search causes a low price range or variance.
In measuring this relationship it is prudent to remove fixed effects from market price levels. Certain markets may set lower prices because wholesale gasoline is cheaper in that area or the market contains firms selling a lower quality gasoline.
45 Additionally, retail gasoline prices reflect the value of secondary products, such as car repair service or grocery items, also sold at the station. The data set does not allow for the effect these characteristics have over market prices to be directly controlled. Accounting for the impact quality, branding, secondary services, etc., is important in determining which markets set prices higher than the value of the product would normally dictate. Fortunately, in the retail gasoline industry the effect of these factors remains constant over time, and can be controlled for by including a fixed effect variable in equation (2) . Thus, to clean price levels of market fixed effects, I estimate the following equation:
and then calculate G it = R it − F E i . Subtracting market fixed effects, F E i , from the true price allows for market characteristics (and firm traits within the market) that do not vary over time to be controlled. Then, two separate regressions are performed: average price range regressed on average cleaned market price and average price variance regressed on average cleaned market price. Both tests reveal a negative relationship between price levels and the gains from search, which is significant with over 99% confidence. 46 Thus, markets posited to provide a low incentive to search actually set higher prices. It is, therefore, unlikely that the cause of low price dispersion is intense consumer search, which would serve to drive down prices, and in turn, confidence can be instilled in the proxies for the incentive to search. Consequently, a negative correlation between average price range (or variance) and the magnitude of price asymmetry stands as strong evidence in favor of hypothesis 2 and search-based theory of asymmetric pricing.
Monopolies Price Symmetrically
Next, I test whether firms with substantial monopoly power incorporate positive cost shocks into their final price more quickly than negative shocks. Asymmetric pricing that arises from consumer search costs disappears if consumers are only capable of purchasing from a single firm, which implies the following testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 Monopolists price symmetrically.
45 Even though gasoline is a relatively homogenous good consumers may perceive more heavily advertised brands as selling higher quality gasoline. 46 The coefficient on G it when range is regressed on it is −.068 and is −.241 for variance.
To test hypothesis 3, I isolate firms with no nearby competitors and measure the extent to which they react more quickly to positive than negative cost shocks. If rockets and feathers is indeed a competitive phenomenon then there should be no distinction between the rate at which monopolies incorporate positive or negative cost changes into their sale price. In order to extract firms from the data set who operate as monopolies, or at least have substantial monopoly power, I first estimate the distribution of the "closest competitor" control variable. This variable states, for each firm, the distance between the firm and its nearest rival. Figure 10 plots the distribution, and the goal is to determine whether firms located in the tail, those without a competitor within a few miles, price symmetrically. I estimate the speed of adjustment to cost shocks for firms located in the top 2.5 percentile of the "closest competitor" distribution. The average distance to the nearest competitor for these firms is 3.5 miles and the minimum distance to the closest competitor is 2.2 miles. After estimating equation (7) at the firm-day level for only firms in the top 2.5 percentile of the distribution, the parameters are substituted into equation (9) to measure the magnitude of asymmetry. Equation (9) calculates, for each day following a cost change, the cumulative adjustment of retail prices following a positive cost shock minus the cumulative adjustment after a negative shock. For a firm to exhibit rockets and feathers pricing, the estimated function must be significantly greater than zero. Figure 11 plots the estimated function and confidence intervals given by equation (9), and it is apparent that firms facing soft competition price with no asymmetry. Here, the estimated function is found to be only slightly above zero, and the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval are almost symmetric about zero. Thus, there is no reason to suspect that monopolies implement rockets and feathers as a pricing strategy. To ensure that this result is because monopolies indeed price symmetrically, and not that the regression lacked power, I perform the same test for firms in the lowest 2.5 percentile of the "closest competitor" distribution. These are firms whose nearest rival is no more than .013 miles away. The result of estimating equation (9) for these firms is plotted in Figure 12 , and firms with a nearby competitor exhibit price asymmetry statistically greater than zero with 95% confidence for almost four days following a cost shock. As there are the same number of observations in this estimation as the monopoly test, it can be assured that the lack of statistical significance for the monopoly group is indeed a consequence of the firms pricing symmetrically. Thus, the empirical results are consistent with hypothesis 3 and the predictions of search-based asymmetry.
6 Focal Price Collusion
Theoretical Background
The econometrics of the previous section revealed that products whose customers have greater search costs are priced with greater asymmetry, markets with less to gain from search exhibit more asymmetry, and monopoly power translates into symmetric pricing. These finding are all consistent with the theory presented in Yang an Ye (2008) and Tappata (2009) . Another common explanation for rockets and feathers is that when prices decrease firms coordinate on the previous period's price in an effort to artificially maintain high prices. In fact, the finding that monopolies exhibit no price asymmetry is consistent with focal price collusion being the underlying mechanism. This section, however, presents sound evidence against collusion being a meaningful determinant of rockets and feathers. After pinpointing firms in the data with the highest potential for collusion, I find that neither the highest priced nor the most cooperative subsets of these firms are more likely to price asymmetrically.
Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997) offered a stylized version of the collusion model developed in Green and Porter (1984) as a motivation for the rockets and feathers phenomenon. In BCG's explanation, firms use the previous period's output price as a focal point for collusion. If costs drop then the previous period's price is maintained until a firm cheats on the agreement and triggers a price war. Conversely, if costs increase then firms raise their price to maintain a positive margin and/or not be viewed as cheating on the collusive agreement. In sum, market prices adjust slower to cost decreases than increases. While this brand of focal price collusion generates price asymmetry, BCG only conjecture it to be the cause of the phenomenon and provide no formal model. Subsequent studies that posit focal price collusion to generate asymmetry provide no proof that coordinating on the previous period's price maximizes firms' profits. Despite the lack of formal theory supporting focal price collusion as a profit maximizing strategy, it has become a common explanation for asymmetric pricing, and Lewis (2010) does provide some supporting empirical evidence.
Empirical Tests of Focal Price Collusion
If collusion is the root cause of asymmetric pricing then firms engaging in the (possibly tacit) agreement, and thereby exhibiting a substantial degree of price asymmetry, should be able to sustain prices at least as high as similar, but non-collusive firms. If the collusive firms set lower prices than their rivals then they would be better off breaking the agreement and setting the price charged by the non-collusive firms. Consequently, if focal price collusion is the cause of rockets and feathers there should exist a positive correlation between the magnitude of asymmetry and price levels.
In making this connection, however, the influence of consumer demand and other pertinent market characteristics over retail prices must be removed. Given the geographic variability in the data, it would make little sense to simply test the correlation between average prices and the degree of asymmetry, as firms in the data set face a wide variety of demand conditions. Therefore, "high priced" ("low priced") firms are defined as those who consistently price above (below) their market's average price. By measuring a firm's price relative to other firms in the same market, both long-run variability in demand across markets and short-run demand shocks can be controlled for in the econometric process. Note, however, that firms that generally price above the market average may do so because they offer a higher quality product. If price levels are largely driven by quality then "high priced" firms may not be those entered in collusive agreements. In essence, the power of the subsequent tests of collusion is dependent upon the extent to which collusion influences pricecost margins relative to other factors, such as product quality. Yet, if focal price collusion does significantly raise price levels and generate price asymmetry then the following hypothesis will hold true.
Hypothesis 4 Groups of closely located firms that consistently price above the market average exhibit more asymmetry than firms that price below the average.
To test hypothesis 4, I first isolate the set of retailers most likely to be participating in a collusive agreement. Therefore, the data set is refined to only include firms that have exactly one competitor within .1 miles. In general, the ability to maintain collusion decreases in the number of firms entered in the agreement and increases in the ability to monitor behavior. By isolating firms with a single rival whose prices are costlessly observable, only firms with the maximum potential for collusion are included in the analysis. Then, both the average price charged by the two closely located firms, p f t , and the average price charged by all other firms within 1.5 miles, p kt , for each day t, are calculated. Given these values the following dummy variable, d pt , is constructed:
In words, d pt takes a value of one if and only if the average price of the two firms is greater than the market average on day t. The dummy variable, therefore, distinguishes between retailers who fall above or below the approximate mean of their market's price distribution on a particular day. After partitioning firms according to d pt in each time period, the next step is to isolate firms who consistently fall above, or below, the mean of the the daily price distribution. Specifically, two more dummy variables, indicating "high priced" and "low priced" firms, are created using the following statistic:
Here, T j is the set of days for which I have available price data for the firms in market j. S then calculates the percentage of days such that the average price of the closely located firms is greater than the market average. This statistic allows for a distinction to be made between firms who regularly price above, or below, their competitors. After partitioning the distribution of S values into quintiles, I estimate CRF's for the pairs of firms located in the upper and lower quintile.
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Firms in the lower quintile price above the market average between 0 and 17% of the time and firms in the upper quintile price above the market average between 72% and 100% of the days. Figure 13 plots the CRF's for pairs of firms that consistently price above or below their market's average, and the line estimates find low priced firms pricing more asymmetrically; they adjust faster to positive cost shocks and slower to negative cost changes. This is a direct contradiction of the prediction of rockets and feathers generated by focal price collusion; high priced firms should price more asymmetrically. Despite the appearance of low priced firms as more asymmetric in Figure 13 , at the 95% confidence level, there is no statistical distinction between positive or negative reactions between the two types of firms. 48 Moreover, there is no significant difference in the magnitude of asymmetry as measured by equation (9) . Thus, the estimations yield no support for focal price collusion as the determinant of rockets and feathers. As a robustness check, I classify low and high priced firms using a different definition and estimate their response to cost shocks. First, the analysis is refocused to the market level, and a market is defined as in the previous subsection; each firm exists at the center of a unique market of radius 1.5 miles.
49 Then, equation (11) is estimated using OLS, where R it is the average market price for regular fuel in market i at time t, C it is the wholesale cost, and F E i is a market specific fixed effect. F E i captures the extent to which a market's retail price varies, on average, from the price predicted by the long-run relationship between price and cost. Markets with a fixed effect well above zero generally have a higher price than other markets in the data set, and markets with a fixed effect well below zero typically set a lower price. The advantage of defining high and low priced markets in this way is that it enables detection of focal price collusion involving firms throughout an entire market. The previous definition may exclude closely located pairs of firms whose collusive prices are part of a larger agreement across the market. The disadvantage to this new definition is 47 I estimate equation (7) using the average price of the two closely located firms as the retail price variable. Thus, I am performing a market-level daily analysis where a market is defined as having a firm at the center and the .1 mile radius around the firm. The data is restricted to only include a firm with one competitor within .1 miles.
48 To say there is no statistical distinction in the magnitude of asymmetry means that this is true from the first day following a price shock until prices have completely adjusted to the new equilibrium.
49 For this analysis all firms are allowed to be at the center of a unique market, not just those with one competitor within .1 miles.
that differences across markets, like demand conditions, are only controlled for to the extent that the control variables account for them.
CRF's for firms in the lower and upper quintile of the F E i distribution are graphed in Figure  14 . The response functions are qualitatively similar to those estimated for the previous definition of high and low priced markets. Low price markets react faster to positive cost shocks over the first five days following the cost change; however, the difference in the speed of adjustment is not statistically significant. High and low price markets react almost identically to negative cost changes, and thus, there is no meaningful difference in the magnitude of price asymmetry between high and low priced markets. Neither of the definitions, therefore, find a connection between price levels and asymmetric pricing, which contradicts hypothesis 4 and focal price collusion as the motivator of rockets and feathers. 50 
Conclusion
In this paper, I identify the existence of rockets and feathers in the retail gasoline industry, but more importantly, provide sound evidence in support of consumer search costs as the underlying cause. By examining the markup of premium over regular fuel, I find that individual firms price premium gasoline with more asymmetry than regular, and the increased asymmetry is entirely a result of premium prices falling slower. As premium consumers are typified by greater search costs, this result supports the theories presented in Tappata (2009) and Yang and Ye (2008) . Moreover, the relationship between measures of price dispersion (which serve as a proxy for the incentive to search) and rockets and feathers is consistent with search-based theory.
Conversely, I find little evidence in favor of focal price collusion as a consequential determinant of asymmetric pricing. Even though monopolies price symmetrically (which is also in accordance with search theory) there is no connection between price levels and asymmetry. In addition, firms with the highest probability of being engaged in a collusive agreement price with no more asymmetry than firms that almost certainly are not colluding. Given that there exists no formal theory of focal price collusion that produces asymmetric pricing, and that I find no evidence in favor of the informal hypothesis, there is no reason to suspect that collusion is a relevant factor.
In future research, however, the propensity for collusion amongst closely located firms warrants a closer look. In this study, I illustrate that colluding on the previous period's price is not the mechanism behind asymmetric pricing. This is not to say, however, that collusion is absent from the retail gasoline industry; it only shows that the chosen method of collusion does not generate asymmetric pricing. If, for example, firms agree upon an artificially high markup over wholesale costs then retail prices will adjust symmetrically to cost shocks. More generally addressing the issue of collusion, perhaps by analyzing instances of price wars, offers an avenue for future research. Finally, the richness of data used throughout the empirical investigation affords the opportunity to generalize results. The data set includes daily price observations for over 11,000 stations located in the east and west coasts, and in both rural and urban areas. Thus, the findings in the this paper can be viewed as results typical of the retail gasoline market, and not relics of unique markets 8 Tables Notes: The sample includes price observations from 7/30/08 -7/29/09 for over 11,000 gas stations, and the units are US ¢. The price observations were scraped daily from gasprices.mapquest.com, whose data is provided by the Oil Price Information Service (OPIS), for all gas stations in the states of NJ, VA, MD, WA and the cities of Philadelphia, PA and Washington, DC. Cost data is a daily weighted-average of the closing spot price of reformulated gasoline shipped from the Los Angeles, CA and NY, NY harbors; the weights used to average the cost data reflect the proportion of gas stations in the data set located in the west or east coast of the United States. The model was estimated for lag length n = 10, but all estimates are not reported due to lack of space. Also unreported are estimates of the parameters for market characteristic control variables: log of population, the number of competitors within .1 miles, between .1 and 1.5 miles, and between 1.5 and 5 miles, the distance of the closest competitor, the percentage of unbranded stations within .1, between .1 and 1.5 miles, and between 1.5 and 5 miles, and day of the week dummies. All unreported estimates are available upon request. The CRF's constructed from the estimates are graphed in Figure 3 . Standard errors are listed in parenthesis below the estimate, clustered by station, and robust to heteroscedasticity. Significant at 1% = ***, significant at 5% = **, significant at 5% = *. Notes: The market average price variables, of which one period lagged differences are used in the three separate regressions as dependent variables, are stated in the first row. Premium -Regular is the average market markup of premium over regular gasoline. ∆C and ϑ − 1 are parameter estimates of the error-correction term. The model was estimated for lag length n = 10, but all estimates are not reported due to lack of space. Also unreported are estimates of the parameters for market characteristic control variables: the number of competitors and the percentage of those who are unbranded in the market and between 1.5 and 5 miles of the market center, the log of population of the market, and day of the week controls. Unreported estimates are available upon request. CRF's constructed from columns one and two are plotted in Figure 6 and the CRF corresponding to column three is in Figure 7 . Standard errors are listed in parenthesis below the estimate, clustered by market, and robust to heteroscedasticity. Significant at 1% = ***, significant at 5% = **, significant at 5% = *. Figure 1   9 Notes: Retail price is the daily average price for regular unleaded fuel for all firms in the data set. Wholesale is a daily weighted-average of the closing spot price of reformulated gasoline shipped from the Los Angeles, CA and NY, NY Harbors; the weights used to average the cost data reflect the proportion of gas stations in the data set located in the west or east coast of the United States. Table 4 . The positive (negative) cumulative response function measures, on each day, the proportion of a one unit positive (negative) cost shock at t = 0 that has been incorporated into a firm's retail price. Table 4 are used to estimate equation (9) , which measure, on each day, the cumulative speed of adjustment to a positive shock minus the adjustment to a negative shock. The estimated function being greater than zero evidences asymmetric pricing. Notes: Retail price predictions are regular octane fuel pre-tax estimates. Asymmetric prices are predicted using parameter estimates of equation (7) for lag length n=10. Symmetric prices are predicted using parameter estimates of equation (7), but the lagged negative changes in cost parameters, C Table 5 are used to estimated the CRF's for market average premium and regular gasoline prices, respectively. Both price series exhibit price asymmetry with more than 95% confidence. Notes: Parameters from column 3 of Table 5 are used to estimate the CRF's, which track the response of the markup of premium over regular gasoline to positive and negative cost shocks. The markup has a negative proportional response to a negative shock (meaning the gap increases), and has a response close to zero to a positive shock. Notes: CRF's are estimated for markets with an average price range in the lower or upper quintile of average price range distribution. Markets have an average price range of 4.26¢ and 21.93¢ in the "low" and "high" group, respectively. Markets with a low average price range exhibit more price asymmetry (1.1¢ cumulative difference ten days after a one cent cost shock) with 95% confidence level. Notes: CRF's are estimated for markets with an average price variance in the lower or upper quintile of the average price variance distribution. Markets have an average price variance of 9.83¢ and 87.33¢ in the "low" and "high" group, respectively. Markets with a high average price variance have less price asymmetry at the 95% confidence level. Notes: This figure plots the distribution of the "closest competitor" variable, which for each firm gives the distance, in miles, of the nearest rival. Notes: This plots the estimate of equation (9), which measures, on each day, the cumulative speed of adjustment to a positive shock minus the adjustment to a negative shock, for firms whose closest competitor is at least 2.2 miles away. These firms, which have a substantial degree of monopoly power, show no price asymmetry. Notes: This plots the estimate of equation (9) for firms whose closest competitor is no more than .013 miles away. With 95% confidence these firms price asymmetrically for up to 4 days following a cost shock. Notes: CRF's are estimated for markets whose average price is in the top or lower quintile of the average market price distribution ("High Fixed Effect" and "Low Fixed Effect", respectively). Markets have a fixed effect of -8.79¢ and 10.98¢ in the "low" and "high" group, respectively. Throughout the course of adjustment there is no statistically significant distinction in the degree of asymmetry of the two groups.
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